Abstract. We present Bitcoin Security Tables computing the probability of success p(z, q, t) of a double spend attack by an attacker controlling a share q of the hashrate after z confirmations in time t.
Introduction.
The main breakthrough in [2] is the solution to the double spend problem of an electronic currency unit without a central authority. Bitcoin is the first form of peerto-peer (P2P) electronic currency.
A double spend attack can only be attempted with a substantial fraction of the hashrate used in the Proof-of-Work of the Bitcoin network. The attackers will start a double spend race against the rest of the network to replace the last blocks of the blockchain. The last section of [2] computes the probability that the attackers catch up. Following Nakamoto, by "success of the attackers" we mean catching up the z blocks, although to replace the blocks the attackers need to validate z + 1. In [1] we correct Nakamoto's analysis based on an abusive approximation and give a closed-form formula for the exact probability.
Theorem 1. (C. Grunspan, R. Pérez-Marco, [1])
Let 0 < q < 1/2, resp. p = 1 − q, the relative hash power of the group of the attackers, resp. of honest miners. After z blocks have been validated by the honest miners, the probability of success of the attackers is We carry out a more accurate risk analysis by considering not only the number of confirmations z but also the time t it took for the last z validated blocks, which is an information that is clearly available.
In practice, in order to avoid a double spend attack, the recipient of the bitcoin transaction waits for z ≥ 1 confirmations. He also has the information on the time t it took to confirm the transaction z times. Obviously the probability of success of the attackers increases with t since he has more time to secretly mine his alternative blockchain. In [1] we carry out a more precise risk analysis considering this available data. The relevant dimensionless parameter introduced is the relative deviation from the expected time
where τ 0 is the expected validation time of a new block (τ 0 = 10 min for the Bitcoin network). In [1] we give a closed-form formula for the probability P (z, q, κ) that the attackers catch up with the current chain.
We have
After a validation z has been observed in the network and the time t being measured, and r = t zt 0 , one can compute the probabilities
that give the probability of the attackers to catch up the current blockchain. We tabulate these probabilities for z = 1, 2, . . . , 10.
Use of the tables.
The tables are useful to determine the number of confirmations needed for a given transaction. In practice, someone receiving a bitcoin transaction will check after z confirmations the corresponding table. With the measured time t, he will compute r = t zt 0 , and check the value ofP (z, q, r) and then asses the level of risk assumed accepting the payment.
Satoshi Risk Tables.
Below we give the tables for z = 1, 2, . . . , 9 ofP (z, q, r) for different values of q and r in % with 2 decimal places. These are what is needed for practical applications. 
